( 1 )  U.S. Marshal Paul Safier, is a U.S. Marshal in Trenton, New  Jersey.   His phone number is 609-989-2069.  Call him.  Ask him why he sanctions and endorses criminal conduct.  He is well aware of the constitutional violations and criminal conduct in my case.  His email is psafier@usms.doj.gov.  The other email address is my attorney’s, Jerald Di Chiara.

What follows is one of about 12 cases, or more, throughout the country that shows we can go to the Grand Jury.    In some states, we can go directly, we do not have to go through the Court  [ the supervising judge ] or the prosecutor, as this case indicates, from the Southern district of New York.

US Marshal James Howard, in the Southern district of New York knows that when I go to a Grand Jury, the Grand Jury will indict him.  Because US Marshal James Howard conspired in criminal conduct against me, since 2009, I was unlawfully imprisoned in 2010.   US Marshal James Howard already admitted that he is on the wrong side of the law, and has been for a long time.

I already went to the U.S. Attorney in New Jersey, Paul Fishman, and caught his office lying to DC, claiming I was never there.  I already aired on my TV show the video tape that shows I was at his office.

I already went to the U.S. Attorney in Brooklyn, New York, Loretta Lynch.   Loretta Lynch is now the U.S. Attorney General.  What is she going to do?  Prosecute herself?   I already have hard evidence against Loretta Lynch and other US Attorneys.

This case was decided in the Southern district of New York in 1985.  For constitutional violations  the prosecutor must prosecute.   For racketeering the prosecutor must prosecute.  

( 2 )  My attorney, Jerald Di Chiara has a responsibilty to bring the constiutional violations and other crimes committed against me to the Grand Jury immediately because as an attorney in New York he will be dis-barred under New York Judicial law section 487 for colluding in any deceit or deception.  I already have sworn affidavits that speak to the crimes, deceit and deception committed by Yeshiva University and the Manhattan District Attorney’s office against me.

***********************************************************************************************

617 F.Supp. 199 (1985)

In the Matter of In re GRAND JURY APPLICATION.

No. 85 Civ. 2235 (VLB).

April 25, 1985.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

*200 Neal Schwarzfeld, Schwarzfeld, Ganfer & Shore, New York City, for Bandler

& Kass, Robert Sylvor and William J. Werner.

200

Russell, Piccoli, Phoenix, Ariz., Herbert C. Ross, Jr., Rogers Hoge & Hills, New

York City, for plaintiffs.

Susan Harkins, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, for U.S. Atty.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

VINCENT L. BRODERICK, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, in their complaint and now by motion, seek either a writ of mandamus to

compel the United States Attorney to present the “facts” concerning alleged

criminal wrongdoing of certain named defendants to the grand jury or for me to

request the grand jury to hear testimony by plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Piccoli,

concerning that wrongdoing.[1] They base their *201 complaint and motion on 18

U.S.C. § 3332(a), which states:

201

It shall be the duty of each such grand jury impaneled within any

judicial district [special grand juries impanelled pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

• 3331] to inquire into offenses against the criminal laws of the United

States alleged to have been committed within that district. Such

alleged offenses may be brought to the attention of the grand jury by

the court or by any attorney appearing on behalf of the United States

for the presentation of evidence. Any such attorney receiving

information concerning such an alleged offense from any other person

shall, if requested by such other person, inform the grand jury of such

alleged offense, the identity of such other person, and such attorney’s

action or recommendation.

At the outset, I would point out that plaintiffs do not seek to compel the U.S.

Attorney to prosecute the named defendants. Rather, they seek to have either the

court or the United States Attorney present certain information to the grand jury.

This distinction is critical because almost the entirety of the opposition to plaintiffs’

motion is based on the mischaracterization by the U.S. Attorney and the other

defendants of plaintiffs’ motion as one seeking to compel the U.S. Attorney to

initiate proceedings against the other defendants.

Thus the U.S. Attorney argues that plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit

because “a private litigant lacks a sufficiently distinct interest in a criminal

prosecution to compel its initiation.” Govt. Memo at 7, citing Linda R.S. v. Richard

D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973); see Leeke v.

Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87, 102 S.Ct. 69, 70-71, 70 L.Ed.2d 65 (1981);

Heckler v. Chaney, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) and

other cases. He argues that because presenting the information to the grand jury

might not lead to an indictment, or conviction, or ultimately to an award in the

plaintiffs’ pending civil action, plaintiffs’ interest is too attenuated from the relief

sought to justify allowing them to bring the instant action.

“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates

standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda R.S. v.

Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148 n. 3, 35 L.Ed.2d 536

(1973). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d

343 (1975); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212, 93 S.Ct.

364, 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Hardin v. Kentucky

Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6, 88 S.Ct. 651, 654, 19 L.Ed.2d 787 (1968). When

determining whether a plaintiff has standing, I need only examine the complaint to

see if the plaintiff has alleged that he has suffered a cognizable injury. Nash v.

Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir.1980). 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) creates a duty on

the part of the United States Attorney that runs to the plaintiffs, and the breach of

that duty gives the plaintiffs standing to seek its enforcement.[2]

The defendants contend that “the decision to prosecute is the exclusive

prerogative of the Executive Branch.” Govt.Memo at 10, citing United States v.

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Nathan v. Smith,

737 F.2d 1069 *202 (D.C.Cir.1984); Inmates of Attica Correction Facility v.

Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.1973); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234

(D.C.Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906, 86 S.Ct. 1341, 16 L.Ed.2d 359 (1966),

and other cases. They characterize plaintiffs’ complaint and motion as attempts to

compel the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the other named defendants, and, relying

on the above cited cases, argue that courts have uniformly denied such relief. But

no case cited has considered the requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a).

The only opinion I have found that even indirectly deals with the issue presented

in this case is Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069

(D.C.Cir.1984).

202

In Nathan, the issue was prosecutorial discretion under the Ethics in Government

Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591 et seq. Section 591(a) provided[3] in relevant part:

The Attorney General shall conduct an investigation pursuant to the

provisions of this chapter whenever the Attorney General receives

specific information that any of the persons described in subsection

(b) of this section has committed a violation of any Federal criminal

law other than a violation constituting a petty offense.

Judge Bork stated:

It may be thought that neither the relief granted by the district court

nor that sought by the plaintiffs falls within the principle of Executive

control of decisions to prosecute. The district court ordered the

Attorney General to initiate a preliminary investigation; the plaintiffs

seek to compel an application for the appointment of an independent

counsel. The distinction between these remedies and the

[prosecutorial discretion] principle discussed above has no

significance, however. The only purpose of the preliminary

investigation under the Ethics Act is to enable a report to the special

division of this court about the need or the lack of a need for the

appointment of independent counsel. The preliminary investigation is

thus the first stage of the prosecutorial process and the district court

has undertaken to control that stage.

Plaintiffs would have the district court control the next stage as well

ordering the Attorney General to apply to the special division of this

court for the appointment of an independent counsel. It is no answer

to say that the courts, under either form of relief, would not control the

final prosecutorial decision since that would be made by the

independent counsel. There are at least two flaws in that reasoning.

The first is that the principle of Executive control extends to all phases

of the prosecutorial process. Thus, were this a case about an ordinary

prosecution under a federal criminal statute, a plaintiff could not

escape the principle discussed by demanding only an order that the

Attorney General present facts to a grand jury but leaving the decision

whether to sign any indictment to him. Second, if private plaintiffs

have the legal ability to require an investigation of criminal charges, it

is difficult to understand by what principle they could be denied a

cause of action to compel the independent counsel to prosecute if that

counsel had sufficient evidence to do so under the policies of the

Department of Justice, which the Act requires him to follow. 28 U.S.C.

• 594(f) (1982). If the execution of the laws is lodged by the

Constitution in the President, that execution may not be divided up

into segments, some of which courts may control and some of which

the President’s delegate may control. *203 It is all the law enforcement

power and it all belongs to the Executive. It may be that answers can

be given that avoid or modify these traditional views. No such

answers have been offered in this case, however.

203

737 F.2d at 1079 (emphasis added).

Contrary to what Judge Bork stated, Congress has divided the execution of the

law into segments, with the presentation of information to the grand jury

concerning racketeering violations being an area where the prosecutor’s discretion

was explicitly removed. Judge Bork himself recognized that judicial opinion was

not unanimous on this question. The portion of his concurrence emphasized

above is a criticism of the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United

States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.1965). In Cox a 4-3 majority held that a

United States Attorney could not be compelled to sign an indictment returned by

the grand jury, and that without his signature the indictment would have no legal

effect. 342 F.2d at 172. A different 4-3 majority held, however, that the United

States Attorney could be required to assist the grand jury by drafting an indictment

in accordance with their wishes, even if he had no intention of signing it if it were

voted a true bill. 342 F.2d at 181. Accord, Report and Recommendation of June

5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F.Supp. 1219 (D.D.C.1974).

In other contexts, courts have acknowledged that prosecutorial discretion is not

absolute. In Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C.Cir.1965), cert.

denied, 384 U.S. 906, 86 S.Ct. 1341, 16 L.Ed.2d 359 (1966), the court stated:

“[w]e will assume, without deciding, that where Congress has withdrawn all

discretion from the prosecutor by special legislation, a court might be empowered

to force prosecutions in some circumstances.” This term in Wayte v. United

States, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985), the Supreme Court

stated that prosecutorial discretion is not “`unfettered.’ Selectivity in the

enforcement of criminal laws is … subject to constitutional constraints.” ___ U.S.

at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1531 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,

125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)).

Also this term, in Heckler v. Chaney, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d

714 (1985), the Supreme Court equated an agency’s refusal to take requested

enforcement action with a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute. After reviewing

the numerous reasons why judicial review of such decisions was unsuitable the

court went on to say:

Thus, in establishing this presumption [of the unreviewability of

agency action] in the APA, Congress did not set agencies free to

disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency

administers. Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement

power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by

otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to discriminate among

issues or cases it will pursue.

___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1657.

Plaintiffs argue that the language of § 3332(a) is clear and unambiguous: “Any

such attorney receiving information concerning such an alleged offense from any

other person shall, if requested by such other person, inform the grand jury of

such alleged offense, the identity of such other person, and such attorney’s action

or recommendation.” They contend that the duty to present the information is

mandatory. Defendants contend that use of such mandatory language is common

throughout the criminal provisions of the United States Code and has often been

held to permit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, ___

U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1657; Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.

Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir.1973) (“The mandatory nature of the word

`required’ as it appears in [42 U.S.C.] § 1987 is insufficient to evince a broad

Congressional purpose to bar the exercise of executive discretion in the

prosecution of federal civil rights crimes.”). The resolution of this issue lies in an

analysis of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a).

*204 The forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) was introduced to the Senate on

January 16, 1969 as part of Title I of the Organized Crime Control Act, S.30. The

purpose of the Act was to eradicate organized crime. To accomplish this aim S.30

was designed to strengthen and vitalize the various legal tools available to the

government in the evidence gathering process. Title I of the Act contained

proposed amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3321 et seq. concerning grand juries. The

purpose of these amendments was to “strengthen” the “broad powers of inquiry”

of grand juries.[4] Statement of Sen. McClellan, Hearings before the

Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the

Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong. at 503 (1969) (hereinafter “Senate

Hearings”). As Senator McClellan, one of the bill’s co-sponsors, explained:

204

The jury would not be limited by the charge of the court but would

have the right to pursue any violation of the criminal law within its

jurisdiction. Citizens would be accorded the right to contact the jury,

through the foreman, regarding any alleged criminal act.

Id.

Section 103(a) of the proposed Act contained the antecedent of 18 U.S.C. §

3332(a). It provided in pertinent part:

Section 3324, title 18, United States Code is amended as follows:

• 3324. Powers and duties

* * * * * *

(b) It shall be the duty of each grand jury impaneled within any judicial

district to inquire into each offense against the criminal laws of the

United States alleged to have been committed within that district

which is brought to the attention of the grand jury by the court or by

any person.

(c) No person shall be deprived of opportunity to communicate to the

foreman of a grand jury any information concerning any such alleged

offense or instance of misconduct.

Senate Hearings at 7.

As Senator McClellan explained during the Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5

of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Ninety-First

Congress, Second Session on S.30 (hereinafter “House Hearings”) (1969), Title I

of S.30 “guaranteed a measure of independence” to the special grand juries it

authorized. House Hearings at 82. When pressed by the chairman of the House

committee on the “need for granting special grand juries almost complete

autonomy from the Federal district court and the U.S. Attorney,” Senator

McClellan stated: “Congress has ample grounds for determining that a need

exists for creation of special Federal grand juries with substantial independence of

the prosecutor and court.” House Hearings at 118.

Although not the most controversial aspect of the Act, much comment both pro

and con was elicited during the House and Senate hearings concerning the

provisions of the bill concerning grand juries. The chairman of the House

Committee on the Judiciary stated, “[w]ith reference to Title I[,] … we have

opposition expressed from the Judicial Conference of the United States[,]…. the

New York County Lawyers Association[,] … the Association of the Bar of the City

of New York[,]…. the National Association of Counties—United States Conference

of Mayors and the American Civil Liberties Union oppose Title I.” House Hearings

at 177-78.

Title I had powerful supporters as well. In a memorandum submitted to the Senate

committee by then Attorney General John Mitchell, the Justice Department voiced

its support of Title I:

*205 Proposed section 3324(b) provides that “It shall be the duty of

each grand jury impaneled within any judicial district to inquire into

each offense against the criminal laws of the United States alleged to

have been committed within the district which is brought to the

attention of the grand jury by the court or by any person.” This

provision is a statutory recognition of existing case law holding that

the inquisitorial powers of a grand jury are virtually unlimited and that

the grand jury can initiate a case on its own and investigate any

alleged violation of Federal law within its jurisdiction. See Hale v.

Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 [26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652] (1906); Blair v.

United States, 250 U.S. 273 [39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979] (1919);

205

United States v. Hartke-Hanks Newspapers, 254 F.2d 366 (C.A.5),

cert. denied, 357 U.S. 938 [78 S.Ct. 1385, 2 L.Ed.2d 1551] (1958); In

Re Grand Jury Investigation (General Motors Corp.), 32 F.R.D. 175

(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 318 F.2d 533 (C.A.2), cert. denied, 375

U.S. 802 [84 S.Ct. 25, 11 L.Ed.2d 37] (1963); United States v. Smyth,

104 F.Supp. 283 (N.D.Calif.1952); United States v. Gray, [sic[*]] 187

F.Supp. 436 (D.C.D.C.1964). Consequently, we can see no objection

to this proposal.

Section 3324(c) provides that no person shall be deprived of

opportunity to communicate to the foreman of a grand jury any

information concerning any offense against the criminal laws of the

United States alleged to have been committed within the district.

Section 1504 of title 18, United States Code, presently makes it an

offense for anyone to attempt to influence the action or decision of

any grand or petit juror upon any matter pending before it by a written

communication. This provision is apparently intended to make it clear

that no violation of this section is committed by a person who merely

communicates to the foreman of a grand jury any information

regarding any offenses against the laws of the United States. This

provision could well encourage wider public participation in the fight

against organized crime and we, therefore, support it.

Senate Hearings at 366-67.

In response to the many criticisms, the provisions of the proposed Act regarding

grand juries were amended. During the House Hearings, Edward L. Wright

presented the views of the American Bar Association, which were essentially

embodied in the Act in its final form.

The American Bar Association recommends that the proposed right of

a private person be modified to require that information possessed by

such person be channelled through the appropriate prosecutor, and

further, that the prosecutor be required in all cases to communicate

his action or recommendation thereon to the special grand jury.

In suggesting this amendment, we are mindful of and are fully in

accord with the well-established tradition of citizen complaints. We

know that criminal justice should and must be everyone’s concern,

and we favor doing everything proper to encourage greater

cooperation by citizens in the war against organized crime. On the

other hand, we are equally cognizant that the proper role of the

professional prosecutor in the United States has been steadily

emerging. It is our belief that the prosecutor should properly be vested

with the responsibility of professionally screening allegations of

criminal misconduct. At the same time, we recommend that there be

built into the process a safeguard that will require the prosecutor to

give an accounting of his screening.

House Hearings at 541 (emphasis in original).

Analysis of the language of the Act as it was finally enacted indicates that

Congress intended the United States Attorney to be the channel through which

ordinary citizens conveyed information about organized crime to the grand jury.

To argue, as the government does (and as Judge Bork did in *206 Nathan, supra),

that the prosecutor has total discretion in deciding what information to present to

206

the grand jury flies in the face of the Act’s legislative history. The section analysis

section of the official legislative history of the bill as it was finally passed contains

the following language:

Section 3332(a) makes it the duty of a special grand jury impaneled

within any judicial district to inquire into Federal offenses alleged to

have been committed within the district. As amended by the

committee, alleged offenses may be brought to the attention of the

special grand jury by the court or by any attorney appearing on behalf

of the United States for the presentation of evidence. Any such

attorney who receives information of an alleged offense from any

person must, if requested by the person, inform the grand jury of the

alleged offense, the identity of the person who conveyed the

information, and his own action or recommendation.

2 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, House Report No. 91-1549, 91st Cong.2d Sess.

(1970) 4007 at 4015.

Thus both the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) and its legislative history indicate

that Congress intended to remove the prosecutor’s discretion in deciding whether

to present information to the grand jury. He retains discretion with respect to how

he acts and what he recommends concerning that information.

18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) creates a right in every person to have information known by

them concerning organized crime to be presented to the grand jury. It provides

two ways for this to occur—either the court may bring it to the grand jury’s

attention or a United States attorney can. Plaintiffs have requested one or the

other form of relief, in the alternative.

In order to grant a request for mandamus a court must find: “(1) a clear right in

the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the

part of the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) no other adequate remedy

available.” Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411

U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 1555, 36 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973).

Plaintiffs have urged me to request the grand jury to hear their evidence against

the defendants. Although a judge may present evidence to a grand jury both

under common law, see O’Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir.1965), and

pursuant to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a), I decline to do so. The

legislative history of Section 3332(a) suggests that Congress envisioned the

United States Attorney’s office as the primary channel of information to the grand

jury. In a busy district such as this, moreover, it is the United States Attorney and

not the individual district judge who is familiar with, and in fact sets, the schedules

of the grand juries which have been impanelled in the district. Any effort by myself

to bring plaintiffs’ information to the attention of a grand jury would necessarily be

channeled through the United States Attorney.

Since the United States Attorney has been requested to present certain

information to the grand jury he must do so. I will not relieve him of a duty which

Congress has seen fit to impose. 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) imposes a “plainly defined

and peremptory duty” on the part of the United States Attorney to present the

plaintiffs’ information concerning the alleged wrongdoing of the other defendants

to the grand jury.

When first presented with plaintiffs’ information in February, the United States

Attorney’s Office declined to act. It cited its heavy caseload, the need to conduct

its own investigation to satisfy internal policies and the need to obtain the approval

of the Justice Department before proceeding, and concluded that the chances of

commencing prosecution of the other defendants named herein before the statute

of limitations ran in May were almost non-existent. The substantial work already

done by plaintiffs’ attorneys in preparing this case and the apparent willingness of

the alleged victims to come forward and testify should greatly facilitate the

investigation *207 of plaintiffs’ allegations by the grand jury. Although the statute

does not specify in what way the United States Attorney should present

information to the grand jury, under the circumstances of this case and in the

interests of efficiency and justice, I strongly urge the United States Attorney to

allow plaintiffs’ attorney, Mr. Piccoli, to appear before the grand jury as a witness.

I note, in any event, that this order does not invade the realm of prosecutorial

discretion. The statute requires that the information proffered by plaintiffs, and the

identity of plaintiffs, be brought to the attention of the grand jury. This order

requires no more.

207

Plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandamus is granted.

SO ORDERED.

[1] Plaintiffs have also included a request that I appoint “a special prosecutor as the Court’s own

representative for presenting the pertinent details of the criminal wrongdoing of [certain named

defendants] to the Grand Jury for its consideration.” They cite no statute or case law authorizing such

relief but rely instead on the court’s “inherent” power. The only statutes dealing with the appointment of

special prosecutors by the court (now called “independent counsel”) all relate to the Ethics in

Government Act, 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq., which is not relevant to this case. Plaintiffs have not briefed

this issue. I do not believe the inherent powers of the court go so far. See Matter of Application for

Appointment of Independent Counsel, 596 F.Supp. 1465 (E.D.N.Y.1984). See also Fed.R. Crim.P.

42(b).

[2] Plaintiffs also argue that the Sedima requirement of a prior conviction gives them a direct financial

interest in seeking prosecution and therefore, standing. That argument fails because of the unfettered

discretion of the government’s attorneys in deciding whether to prosecute.

[3] Section 591(a) was amended in 1983 by Pub.L. 97-409 § 4(a)(1), which substituted “information

sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate” for “specific information” after “the Attorney General

receives.” In light of the holding of Nathan where the court relied on the lack of “specific information” to

deny mandamus, it seems apparent that the amendment to Section 591(a) was designed to make it

clear that the decision to investigate would rest with the Attorney General who would have discretion

to decide whether the information received constituted “sufficient … grounds.”

[4] In its final form the Act did not simply amend the United States Code provisions concerning grand

juries but created new sections requiring the appointment of special grand juries in all judicial districts

with over four million inhabitants. These special grand juries were to be devoted to investigating

organized crime. They had all the powers of regular grand juries plus the explicit authorization to issue

reports concerning either organized crime conditions in the district or malfeasance in office by a public

official.

[*] Editor’s note: citation should be 87 F.Supp. 436 (D.D.C.1949).