( 1 ) U.S. Marshal Paul Safier, is a U.S. Marshal in Trenton, New Jersey. His phone number is 609-989-2069. Call him. Ask him why he sanctions and endorses criminal conduct. He is well aware of the constitutional violations and criminal conduct in my case. His email is email@example.com. The other email address is my attorney’s, Jerald Di Chiara.
What follows is one of about 12 cases, or more, throughout the country that shows we can go to the Grand Jury. In some states, we can go directly, we do not have to go through the Court [ the supervising judge ] or the prosecutor, as this case indicates, from the Southern district of New York.
US Marshal James Howard, in the Southern district of New York knows that when I go to a Grand Jury, the Grand Jury will indict him. Because US Marshal James Howard conspired in criminal conduct against me, since 2009, I was unlawfully imprisoned in 2010. US Marshal James Howard already admitted that he is on the wrong side of the law, and has been for a long time.
I already went to the U.S. Attorney in New Jersey, Paul Fishman, and caught his office lying to DC, claiming I was never there. I already aired on my TV show the video tape that shows I was at his office.
I already went to the U.S. Attorney in Brooklyn, New York, Loretta Lynch. Loretta Lynch is now the U.S. Attorney General. What is she going to do? Prosecute herself? I already have hard evidence against Loretta Lynch and other US Attorneys.
This case was decided in the Southern district of New York in 1985. For constitutional violations the prosecutor must prosecute. For racketeering the prosecutor must prosecute.
( 2 ) My attorney, Jerald Di Chiara has a responsibilty to bring the constiutional violations and other crimes committed against me to the Grand Jury immediately because as an attorney in New York he will be dis-barred under New York Judicial law section 487 for colluding in any deceit or deception. I already have sworn affidavits that speak to the crimes, deceit and deception committed by Yeshiva University and the Manhattan District Attorney’s office against me.
617 F.Supp. 199 (1985)
In the Matter of In re GRAND JURY APPLICATION.
No. 85 Civ. 2235 (VLB).
April 25, 1985.
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
*200 Neal Schwarzfeld, Schwarzfeld, Ganfer & Shore, New York City, for Bandler
& Kass, Robert Sylvor and William J. Werner.
Russell, Piccoli, Phoenix, Ariz., Herbert C. Ross, Jr., Rogers Hoge & Hills, New
York City, for plaintiffs.
Susan Harkins, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, for U.S. Atty.
VINCENT L. BRODERICK, District Judge.
Plaintiffs, in their complaint and now by motion, seek either a writ of mandamus to
compel the United States Attorney to present the “facts” concerning alleged
criminal wrongdoing of certain named defendants to the grand jury or for me to
request the grand jury to hear testimony by plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Piccoli,
concerning that wrongdoing. They base their *201 complaint and motion on 18
U.S.C. § 3332(a), which states:
It shall be the duty of each such grand jury impaneled within any
judicial district [special grand juries impanelled pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
- 3331] to inquire into offenses against the criminal laws of the United
States alleged to have been committed within that district. Such
alleged offenses may be brought to the attention of the grand jury by
the court or by any attorney appearing on behalf of the United States
for the presentation of evidence. Any such attorney receiving
information concerning such an alleged offense from any other person
shall, if requested by such other person, inform the grand jury of such
alleged offense, the identity of such other person, and such attorney’s
action or recommendation.
At the outset, I would point out that plaintiffs do not seek to compel the U.S.
Attorney to prosecute the named defendants. Rather, they seek to have either the
court or the United States Attorney present certain information to the grand jury.
This distinction is critical because almost the entirety of the opposition to plaintiffs’
motion is based on the mischaracterization by the U.S. Attorney and the other
defendants of plaintiffs’ motion as one seeking to compel the U.S. Attorney to
initiate proceedings against the other defendants.
Thus the U.S. Attorney argues that plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit
because “a private litigant lacks a sufficiently distinct interest in a criminal
prosecution to compel its initiation.” Govt. Memo at 7, citing Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973); see Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87, 102 S.Ct. 69, 70-71, 70 L.Ed.2d 65 (1981);
Heckler v. Chaney, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) and
other cases. He argues that because presenting the information to the grand jury
might not lead to an indictment, or conviction, or ultimately to an award in the
plaintiffs’ pending civil action, plaintiffs’ interest is too attenuated from the relief
sought to justify allowing them to bring the instant action.
“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148 n. 3, 35 L.Ed.2d 536
(1973). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d
343 (1975); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212, 93 S.Ct.
364, 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Hardin v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6, 88 S.Ct. 651, 654, 19 L.Ed.2d 787 (1968). When
determining whether a plaintiff has standing, I need only examine the complaint to
see if the plaintiff has alleged that he has suffered a cognizable injury. Nash v.
Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir.1980). 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) creates a duty on
the part of the United States Attorney that runs to the plaintiffs, and the breach of
that duty gives the plaintiffs standing to seek its enforcement.
The defendants contend that “the decision to prosecute is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Branch.” Govt.Memo at 10, citing United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Nathan v. Smith,
737 F.2d 1069 *202 (D.C.Cir.1984); Inmates of Attica Correction Facility v.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.1973); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234
(D.C.Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906, 86 S.Ct. 1341, 16 L.Ed.2d 359 (1966),
and other cases. They characterize plaintiffs’ complaint and motion as attempts to
compel the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the other named defendants, and, relying
on the above cited cases, argue that courts have uniformly denied such relief. But
no case cited has considered the requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a).
The only opinion I have found that even indirectly deals with the issue presented
in this case is Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069
In Nathan, the issue was prosecutorial discretion under the Ethics in Government
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591 et seq. Section 591(a) provided in relevant part:
The Attorney General shall conduct an investigation pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter whenever the Attorney General receives
specific information that any of the persons described in subsection
(b) of this section has committed a violation of any Federal criminal
law other than a violation constituting a petty offense.
Judge Bork stated:
It may be thought that neither the relief granted by the district court
nor that sought by the plaintiffs falls within the principle of Executive
control of decisions to prosecute. The district court ordered the
Attorney General to initiate a preliminary investigation; the plaintiffs
seek to compel an application for the appointment of an independent
counsel. The distinction between these remedies and the
[prosecutorial discretion] principle discussed above has no
significance, however. The only purpose of the preliminary
investigation under the Ethics Act is to enable a report to the special
division of this court about the need or the lack of a need for the
appointment of independent counsel. The preliminary investigation is
thus the first stage of the prosecutorial process and the district court
has undertaken to control that stage.
Plaintiffs would have the district court control the next stage as well
ordering the Attorney General to apply to the special division of this
court for the appointment of an independent counsel. It is no answer
to say that the courts, under either form of relief, would not control the
final prosecutorial decision since that would be made by the
independent counsel. There are at least two flaws in that reasoning.
The first is that the principle of Executive control extends to all phases
of the prosecutorial process. Thus, were this a case about an ordinary
prosecution under a federal criminal statute, a plaintiff could not
escape the principle discussed by demanding only an order that the
Attorney General present facts to a grand jury but leaving the decision
whether to sign any indictment to him. Second, if private plaintiffs
have the legal ability to require an investigation of criminal charges, it
is difficult to understand by what principle they could be denied a
cause of action to compel the independent counsel to prosecute if that
counsel had sufficient evidence to do so under the policies of the
Department of Justice, which the Act requires him to follow. 28 U.S.C.
- 594(f) (1982). If the execution of the laws is lodged by the
Constitution in the President, that execution may not be divided up
into segments, some of which courts may control and some of which
the President’s delegate may control. *203 It is all the law enforcement
power and it all belongs to the Executive. It may be that answers can
be given that avoid or modify these traditional views. No such
answers have been offered in this case, however.
737 F.2d at 1079 (emphasis added).
Contrary to what Judge Bork stated, Congress has divided the execution of the
law into segments, with the presentation of information to the grand jury
concerning racketeering violations being an area where the prosecutor’s discretion
was explicitly removed. Judge Bork himself recognized that judicial opinion was
not unanimous on this question. The portion of his concurrence emphasized
above is a criticism of the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.1965). In Cox a 4-3 majority held that a
United States Attorney could not be compelled to sign an indictment returned by
the grand jury, and that without his signature the indictment would have no legal
effect. 342 F.2d at 172. A different 4-3 majority held, however, that the United
States Attorney could be required to assist the grand jury by drafting an indictment
in accordance with their wishes, even if he had no intention of signing it if it were
voted a true bill. 342 F.2d at 181. Accord, Report and Recommendation of June
5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F.Supp. 1219 (D.D.C.1974).
In other contexts, courts have acknowledged that prosecutorial discretion is not
absolute. In Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C.Cir.1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 906, 86 S.Ct. 1341, 16 L.Ed.2d 359 (1966), the court stated:
“[w]e will assume, without deciding, that where Congress has withdrawn all
discretion from the prosecutor by special legislation, a court might be empowered
to force prosecutions in some circumstances.” This term in Wayte v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985), the Supreme Court
stated that prosecutorial discretion is not “`unfettered.’ Selectivity in the
enforcement of criminal laws is … subject to constitutional constraints.” ___ U.S.
at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1531 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)).
Also this term, in Heckler v. Chaney, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d
714 (1985), the Supreme Court equated an agency’s refusal to take requested
enforcement action with a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute. After reviewing
the numerous reasons why judicial review of such decisions was unsuitable the
court went on to say:
Thus, in establishing this presumption [of the unreviewability of
agency action] in the APA, Congress did not set agencies free to
disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency
administers. Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement
power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by
otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to discriminate among
issues or cases it will pursue.
___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1657.
Plaintiffs argue that the language of § 3332(a) is clear and unambiguous: “Any
such attorney receiving information concerning such an alleged offense from any
other person shall, if requested by such other person, inform the grand jury of
such alleged offense, the identity of such other person, and such attorney’s action
or recommendation.” They contend that the duty to present the information is
mandatory. Defendants contend that use of such mandatory language is common
throughout the criminal provisions of the United States Code and has often been
held to permit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, ___
U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1657; Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir.1973) (“The mandatory nature of the word
`required’ as it appears in [42 U.S.C.] § 1987 is insufficient to evince a broad
Congressional purpose to bar the exercise of executive discretion in the
prosecution of federal civil rights crimes.”). The resolution of this issue lies in an
analysis of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a).
*204 The forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) was introduced to the Senate on
January 16, 1969 as part of Title I of the Organized Crime Control Act, S.30. The
purpose of the Act was to eradicate organized crime. To accomplish this aim S.30
was designed to strengthen and vitalize the various legal tools available to the
government in the evidence gathering process. Title I of the Act contained
proposed amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3321 et seq. concerning grand juries. The
purpose of these amendments was to “strengthen” the “broad powers of inquiry”
of grand juries. Statement of Sen. McClellan, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong. at 503 (1969) (hereinafter “Senate
Hearings”). As Senator McClellan, one of the bill’s co-sponsors, explained:
The jury would not be limited by the charge of the court but would
have the right to pursue any violation of the criminal law within its
jurisdiction. Citizens would be accorded the right to contact the jury,
through the foreman, regarding any alleged criminal act.
Section 103(a) of the proposed Act contained the antecedent of 18 U.S.C. §
3332(a). It provided in pertinent part:
Section 3324, title 18, United States Code is amended as follows:
* * * * * *
(b) It shall be the duty of each grand jury impaneled within any judicial
district to inquire into each offense against the criminal laws of the
United States alleged to have been committed within that district
which is brought to the attention of the grand jury by the court or by
(c) No person shall be deprived of opportunity to communicate to the
foreman of a grand jury any information concerning any such alleged
offense or instance of misconduct.
Senate Hearings at 7.
As Senator McClellan explained during the Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5
of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Ninety-First
Congress, Second Session on S.30 (hereinafter “House Hearings”) (1969), Title I
of S.30 “guaranteed a measure of independence” to the special grand juries it
authorized. House Hearings at 82. When pressed by the chairman of the House
committee on the “need for granting special grand juries almost complete
autonomy from the Federal district court and the U.S. Attorney,” Senator
McClellan stated: “Congress has ample grounds for determining that a need
exists for creation of special Federal grand juries with substantial independence of
the prosecutor and court.” House Hearings at 118.
Although not the most controversial aspect of the Act, much comment both pro
and con was elicited during the House and Senate hearings concerning the
provisions of the bill concerning grand juries. The chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary stated, “[w]ith reference to Title I[,] … we have
opposition expressed from the Judicial Conference of the United States[,]…. the
New York County Lawyers Association[,] … the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York[,]…. the National Association of Counties—United States Conference
of Mayors and the American Civil Liberties Union oppose Title I.” House Hearings
Title I had powerful supporters as well. In a memorandum submitted to the Senate
committee by then Attorney General John Mitchell, the Justice Department voiced
its support of Title I:
*205 Proposed section 3324(b) provides that “It shall be the duty of
each grand jury impaneled within any judicial district to inquire into
each offense against the criminal laws of the United States alleged to
have been committed within the district which is brought to the
attention of the grand jury by the court or by any person.” This
provision is a statutory recognition of existing case law holding that
the inquisitorial powers of a grand jury are virtually unlimited and that
the grand jury can initiate a case on its own and investigate any
alleged violation of Federal law within its jurisdiction. See Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 [26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652] (1906); Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273 [39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979] (1919);
United States v. Hartke-Hanks Newspapers, 254 F.2d 366 (C.A.5),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 938 [78 S.Ct. 1385, 2 L.Ed.2d 1551] (1958); In
Re Grand Jury Investigation (General Motors Corp.), 32 F.R.D. 175
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 318 F.2d 533 (C.A.2), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 802 [84 S.Ct. 25, 11 L.Ed.2d 37] (1963); United States v. Smyth,
104 F.Supp. 283 (N.D.Calif.1952); United States v. Gray, [sic[*]] 187
F.Supp. 436 (D.C.D.C.1964). Consequently, we can see no objection
to this proposal.
Section 3324(c) provides that no person shall be deprived of
opportunity to communicate to the foreman of a grand jury any
information concerning any offense against the criminal laws of the
United States alleged to have been committed within the district.
Section 1504 of title 18, United States Code, presently makes it an
offense for anyone to attempt to influence the action or decision of
any grand or petit juror upon any matter pending before it by a written
communication. This provision is apparently intended to make it clear
that no violation of this section is committed by a person who merely
communicates to the foreman of a grand jury any information
regarding any offenses against the laws of the United States. This
provision could well encourage wider public participation in the fight
against organized crime and we, therefore, support it.
Senate Hearings at 366-67.
In response to the many criticisms, the provisions of the proposed Act regarding
grand juries were amended. During the House Hearings, Edward L. Wright
presented the views of the American Bar Association, which were essentially
embodied in the Act in its final form.
The American Bar Association recommends that the proposed right of
a private person be modified to require that information possessed by
such person be channelled through the appropriate prosecutor, and
further, that the prosecutor be required in all cases to communicate
his action or recommendation thereon to the special grand jury.
In suggesting this amendment, we are mindful of and are fully in
accord with the well-established tradition of citizen complaints. We
know that criminal justice should and must be everyone’s concern,
and we favor doing everything proper to encourage greater
cooperation by citizens in the war against organized crime. On the
other hand, we are equally cognizant that the proper role of the
professional prosecutor in the United States has been steadily
emerging. It is our belief that the prosecutor should properly be vested
with the responsibility of professionally screening allegations of
criminal misconduct. At the same time, we recommend that there be
built into the process a safeguard that will require the prosecutor to
give an accounting of his screening.
House Hearings at 541 (emphasis in original).
Analysis of the language of the Act as it was finally enacted indicates that
Congress intended the United States Attorney to be the channel through which
ordinary citizens conveyed information about organized crime to the grand jury.
To argue, as the government does (and as Judge Bork did in *206 Nathan, supra),
that the prosecutor has total discretion in deciding what information to present to
the grand jury flies in the face of the Act’s legislative history. The section analysis
section of the official legislative history of the bill as it was finally passed contains
the following language:
Section 3332(a) makes it the duty of a special grand jury impaneled
within any judicial district to inquire into Federal offenses alleged to
have been committed within the district. As amended by the
committee, alleged offenses may be brought to the attention of the
special grand jury by the court or by any attorney appearing on behalf
of the United States for the presentation of evidence. Any such
attorney who receives information of an alleged offense from any
person must, if requested by the person, inform the grand jury of the
alleged offense, the identity of the person who conveyed the
information, and his own action or recommendation.
2 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, House Report No. 91-1549, 91st Cong.2d Sess.
(1970) 4007 at 4015.
Thus both the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) and its legislative history indicate
that Congress intended to remove the prosecutor’s discretion in deciding whether
to present information to the grand jury. He retains discretion with respect to how
he acts and what he recommends concerning that information.
18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) creates a right in every person to have information known by
them concerning organized crime to be presented to the grand jury. It provides
two ways for this to occur—either the court may bring it to the grand jury’s
attention or a United States attorney can. Plaintiffs have requested one or the
other form of relief, in the alternative.
In order to grant a request for mandamus a court must find: “(1) a clear right in
the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the
part of the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) no other adequate remedy
available.” Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 1555, 36 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973).
Plaintiffs have urged me to request the grand jury to hear their evidence against
the defendants. Although a judge may present evidence to a grand jury both
under common law, see O’Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir.1965), and
pursuant to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a), I decline to do so. The
legislative history of Section 3332(a) suggests that Congress envisioned the
United States Attorney’s office as the primary channel of information to the grand
jury. In a busy district such as this, moreover, it is the United States Attorney and
not the individual district judge who is familiar with, and in fact sets, the schedules
of the grand juries which have been impanelled in the district. Any effort by myself
to bring plaintiffs’ information to the attention of a grand jury would necessarily be
channeled through the United States Attorney.
Since the United States Attorney has been requested to present certain
information to the grand jury he must do so. I will not relieve him of a duty which
Congress has seen fit to impose. 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) imposes a “plainly defined
and peremptory duty” on the part of the United States Attorney to present the
plaintiffs’ information concerning the alleged wrongdoing of the other defendants
to the grand jury.
When first presented with plaintiffs’ information in February, the United States
Attorney’s Office declined to act. It cited its heavy caseload, the need to conduct
its own investigation to satisfy internal policies and the need to obtain the approval
of the Justice Department before proceeding, and concluded that the chances of
commencing prosecution of the other defendants named herein before the statute
of limitations ran in May were almost non-existent. The substantial work already
done by plaintiffs’ attorneys in preparing this case and the apparent willingness of
the alleged victims to come forward and testify should greatly facilitate the
investigation *207 of plaintiffs’ allegations by the grand jury. Although the statute
does not specify in what way the United States Attorney should present
information to the grand jury, under the circumstances of this case and in the
interests of efficiency and justice, I strongly urge the United States Attorney to
allow plaintiffs’ attorney, Mr. Piccoli, to appear before the grand jury as a witness.
I note, in any event, that this order does not invade the realm of prosecutorial
discretion. The statute requires that the information proffered by plaintiffs, and the
identity of plaintiffs, be brought to the attention of the grand jury. This order
requires no more.
Plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandamus is granted.
 Plaintiffs have also included a request that I appoint “a special prosecutor as the Court’s own
representative for presenting the pertinent details of the criminal wrongdoing of [certain named
defendants] to the Grand Jury for its consideration.” They cite no statute or case law authorizing such
relief but rely instead on the court’s “inherent” power. The only statutes dealing with the appointment of
special prosecutors by the court (now called “independent counsel”) all relate to the Ethics in
Government Act, 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq., which is not relevant to this case. Plaintiffs have not briefed
this issue. I do not believe the inherent powers of the court go so far. See Matter of Application for
Appointment of Independent Counsel, 596 F.Supp. 1465 (E.D.N.Y.1984). See also Fed.R. Crim.P.
 Plaintiffs also argue that the Sedima requirement of a prior conviction gives them a direct financial
interest in seeking prosecution and therefore, standing. That argument fails because of the unfettered
discretion of the government’s attorneys in deciding whether to prosecute.
 Section 591(a) was amended in 1983 by Pub.L. 97-409 § 4(a)(1), which substituted “information
sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate” for “specific information” after “the Attorney General
receives.” In light of the holding of Nathan where the court relied on the lack of “specific information” to
deny mandamus, it seems apparent that the amendment to Section 591(a) was designed to make it
clear that the decision to investigate would rest with the Attorney General who would have discretion
to decide whether the information received constituted “sufficient … grounds.”
 In its final form the Act did not simply amend the United States Code provisions concerning grand
juries but created new sections requiring the appointment of special grand juries in all judicial districts
with over four million inhabitants. These special grand juries were to be devoted to investigating
organized crime. They had all the powers of regular grand juries plus the explicit authorization to issue
reports concerning either organized crime conditions in the district or malfeasance in office by a public
[*] Editor’s note: citation should be 87 F.Supp. 436 (D.D.C.1949).